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Manifesto of 25 German Peace Researchers,
15 November 2006
Proposed by the authors
In an interview in the Die Zeit on 31 August 2006, on the occasion of a
Berlin visit, the Israeli Foreign Minister Zipi Liwni said: “But the
relationship (between Germany and Israel) has always been special and
friendly.” From the German viewpoint, the essence of this special
relationship can be formulated as follows: In view of the atrocity of
the Holocaust and the precarious situation of Israel, Germany must
support the existence and well-being of that country and its population
unconditionally, among other things by supplying state-subsidised
valuable weapons technology, even if Israel violates international law
and human rights and is at war; criticism of Israel’s actions should, if
at all, be extremely subdued and better refrained from, as long as the
country’s existence has not been definitively secured.
Three issues will be discussed here:
1. Is it appropriate and meaningful – as the authors believe it is – to
maintain these “friendly relations” and regard them as “special” in the
sense indicated above?
2. Is Germany really only obliged to Israel in the Near East?
3. If these two questions are seriously raised, what does this mean for
the inner German debate, and for relations between non-Jewish, Jewish
and Muslim Germans?
Whatever answers we and our readers, with or against us, arrive at, one
thing is not in question: The fact that given the historical uniqueness
of the Holocaust, the relationship of non-Jewish Germans to Jews, to all
those who regard themselves as such, is unique and must be characterised
by particular reserve and sensibility, and that nothing can relieve us
of the obligation to resolutely oppose religious Anti-Judaism and
ethnically and/or racially motivated anti-Semitism, wherever they
appear.
Friendship or a “special” friendship?
At the inter-human level there can be no doubt that a stable friendship
is characterised by the fact that friends also warn one another about
mistakes, wrong decisions and wrong actions, and they do this out of a
concern for the other’s well-being. All the more so, when a lot is at
stake for both. As long as such criticism is not made as a moral
judgement or in a derogatory language, but instead with sympathy and
understanding for the circumstances that caused the other to act, with
respect for the freedom of the other, and out of a need to contribute to
his or her (also spiritual and moral) well-being, the friendship will
benefit as a result.
Does this also apply when one of the two has a deep and long-standing
liability towards the other? We believe that the more mature the
friendship, the more this is the case in such a relationship. However,
the required attitude must be sought anew, and found, in each new
situation.
Can this be applied to a large collective or to a political relationship
such as that between Israel and Germany? Do not other laws and standards
apply here? Yes and no. Yes, because the relationship is considerably
more multifaceted, due to the large number of persons involved and their
different experiences and views. Those who personally embody this
collective relationship as active politicians have to take into account
the different feelings and needs of those they represent. Only to a
certain extent can they act as they would personally like to. This must
always and everywhere be taken into account. No, because large
collectives in particular are reliant on critical perceptions and
feedback from outside so that wrong decisions can be righted and the
development of dangerous blind spots and wrong attitudes be prevented.
Let us assume that after the killing of eight Israeli soldiers and the
abduction of two more by the Hizbollah on 12 July 2006 the Israeli
government, as would be normal among friends, had informed the German
government about their intended responses (destruction of a large part
of the infrastructure in Lebanon, including the water, electricity and
oil supplies, and of tourism thanks to the oil spill along the coast;
expulsion of the population from southern Lebanon, deliberate risk of
high civilian casualties in order to achieve at least a military
weakening – if not a disarming – of the Hizbollah; refusal to allow
humanitarian corridors so as to get supplies to those who could not
flee; complete destruction of the Shiite quarters of Lebanese towns; the
week-long blockade of the coast and the airports; and the use of
splinter bombs)?
How might the German government, as a friend of Israel’s, have reacted?
Would it perhaps have been easier for the German government than for the
Israeli government to assess the catastrophic global consequences of
such “massive retaliation” based on the principle of collective
liability? Perhaps the German government would have advised step by step
action or an appeal to the Security Council, or something else. We are
not concerned here with detailing and assessing the possibilities such
friendly advice might involve. It is sufficient for our purposes just to
imagine what “friendship” could have meant in such a case. An absurd
idea? Absurd, certainly, if the relationship continues to be viewed as
“special” in the sense described above. If you distance yourself from
that idea, however, it becomes obvious that it would have been
advantageous both for Israel and for Germany to develop a
pressure-resistant friendship in which criticism, with a supportive not
offensive intent, had a place.
Needless to say, such a change in the relationship between Germany and
Israel would also affect Israel’s relations with the EU, the USA, etc.
This is also not of concern here. Suffice it to say that the change
would not have been detrimental to those involved in any of these cases.
Germany's responsibility towards Palestine
All too frequently, little consideration is given to one particular
consequence of the Holocaust. Until 1933 – 37 years after the
publication of Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat which grounded Zionism,
and 16 years after the Balfour Declaration in which the mandatory power
England promised the Zionists a “homeland” in Palestine – a maximum of
160,000 Jews had emigrated to Palestine. And many of them had taken this
step believing that it would be possible to cultivate and develop the
Holy Land together with the local Arabs. No one was to be expelled, as
Martin Buber was still arguing in 1950. Only after the soon recognisable
radical threat to the Jews in the sphere of influence of the National
Socialists did mass immigration come about, and with it a threat to the
demographic balance with the Arabs. Not least under the shock of the
Holocaust did the international community – against the wish of the Arab
states – decide to accept the resolution of the United Nations on the
foundation of the State of Israel, despite the initial strong
reservations of the British and, for a long time, the US State
Department .
In other words: It was the Holocaust that has permanently inflicted
unbearable suffering on the (Muslim, Christian and Druse) Palestinians
over the past six decades. That is not the same as if the Third Reich
had committed genocide against the Palestinians. Yet in this case too,
the result has been countless dead, the division of families, expulsion,
or accommodation in emergency quarters to this very day. Without the
Holocaust against the Jews, Israel’s politicians would not feel
justified or forced to so stubbornly ignore the human rights of the
Palestinians and the inhabitants of Lebanon in order to secure the
existence of Israel. And without the Holocaust Israel would not receive
the necessary material and political support from the USA in the form
granted above all since the 1990s. (America’s financial aid to Israel is
3 thousand million US dollars annually and thus corresponds to 20% of
all the foreign financial aid given by the USA.)
The Near East Conflict, which has lasted for six decades and is becoming
increasingly savage, undoubtedly has German and, to a degree, European
origins; European to the extent that the German notion of a “final
solution to the Jewish question” was spawned by European Anti-Semitism
and Nationalism. The Palestinian population had no part whatsoever in
the “relocation” of part of Europe’s problems to the Near East.
So it is not only Israel that has a right to special attention,
consideration and friendly criticism from Germany (and Europe). As
Germans, Austrians and Europeans, we are not only co-responsible for the
existence of Israel, which must be secured without reservations for the
future now that history has taken this path, but also co-responsible for
the living conditions of the Palestinian people and a self-determined
future for them.
Once again, it is not possible or necessary to go into detail about what
it would mean to take this responsibility more seriously than it has
been so far. But money transfers alone are not enough. It is clear that
the goal must be an economically-viable Palestine with unimpeded freedom
of movement between the Gaza Strip and West Jordan, not a second-class
state, not a homeland, not a fragmented Bantustan. And only a negotiated
settlement, not a one-sidedly decreed one, has a chance of survival. It
is also clear that every effort must be made to decrease the
attractiveness for Palestinians of taking part in murderous
assassinations and rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, and to increase
the attractiveness of participating in constructive reconstruction work.
With appropriate support, European Muslims could contribute towards
promoting greater recognition in Palestine of those basic Islamic values
which oppose suicide bombings, which were not invented by Muslims, and
towards publicising and acknowledging Islamic models of peaceful
resistance to state injustice.
Israel’s security can only be guaranteed in the long-term when it has
around it neighbours who are so content with their individual and state
living conditions and future prospects that they can even begin to think
of a joint negotiation of solutions for the problems in the whole of the
Near East – such as, for example, the use and distribution of water. And
the security and intactness of Palestine and the Palestinians can only
then be guaranteed when Israelis no longer fear being driven into the
sea. In view of all the past horrors, perhaps there must actually be a
separation – without annexations – for several decades, including
corridors through tunnels between Palestine’s different regions – until
the situation has settled down. Voluntary encounters especially between
young people on “neutral ground” could at the same time help to
eliminate stereotype perceptions on both sides.
A German approach that does justice to the Holocaust and its
consequences for both sides means accepting responsibility for a
transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is only
possible if that transformation is balanced. The first prerequisite for
this is that the suffering and injustice (the violence of the conflict)
on both sides be perceived, and that the need for security, human
dignity and contract compliance on both sides be taken into account. Not
only the military groups of Palestinians and the Hizbollah have
destroyed the spirit of Oslo through their mortar attacks and the
continued suicide bombings; the illegal continuation and massive
expansion, since the time of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, of Israeli
settlements in the occupied territories, the arbitrary destruction of
houses, gardens, olive groves, and infrastructure, the daily humiliation
of Palestinians, and finally the de facto annexation of about 10% of the
West Bank by means of what is called a “fence”, which in parts is an
eight-metre-high wall, have had the same fatal impact. The question of
cause and effect here is like that of the chicken and the egg:
unproductive. A solution to the conflict is only possible in the very
long term in the framework of a joint regional economic Near East
cooperation, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. By contrast, a
transformation of the conflict can begin immediately. This demands
renewed efforts to find a modus vivendi that draws conclusions from the
mistakes of Oslo. German policy could make a contribution here if it
sees itself as friendly towards both sides.
What does all this mean for the inner-German discourse?
The intimated, and in our view desirable, change in the German attitude
also presupposes changes in inner-German relations. Despite a serious
engagement with the causes, course and effects of the Holocaust in
literature, art and science and in different psychotherapeutic schools,
prejudices, resentment and mistrust towards Jews are still widespread in
Germany. Anti-Semitism is stubbornly alive not only in dismal neo-Nazi
peripheral areas, it is also to be found, more or less disguised, in the
mainstream of the German population and the big political parties.
At the same time, the guiding forces in German politics and society have
reduced the grief about the incredible outrage to more or less empty
rituals and therefore impeded rather than promoted a change in attitude.
The result is a problematic philo-Semitism. Problematic because
ultimately the mere inversion of a rigid enemy-image that has no link
with reality is just the same thing in reverse, and is also immune to
reality and to differentiated judgement. In his Dialectic of
Enlightenment Theodor W. Adorno ascertained that it was not the
“anti-Semitic ticket” that was anti-Semitic, but the “ticket mentality”
as such. Along with the above-mentioned tacit prohibition of open
criticism of Israeli decisions, philo-Semitism in Germany strengthens
anti-Semitism rather than weakening it.
Much has to be done to enable young Muslim, German and Jewish people to
develop a positive relationship with one another. In the long run, a
German Near East policy that is open and friendly to both sides will
only be possible when it gains the support of both the Jews and the
Muslims in Germany, and when anti-Semitism is clearly restrained. As
long as one of these two groups feels undervalued or ostracised, nothing
can become of peaceful coexistence or equal dialogue.
Each new attack on Israeli civilians, each new violation of the rule of
commensurability by the Israeli army and government, increases the camp
mentality in Germany for and against Israel, a mentality which has
already taken on frightening dimensions. In this situation what is
necessary is a broad public and open debate on the questions raised
here. Ultimately, the fact is that in a democracy (and not only there)
“the” politicians can only successfully implement and assert the policy
that is desired by the large majority of the citizens. It is no longer
sufficient, therefore, to shake one’s head in private at Israel’s
actions or to clench one’s fist in view of the attacks by Hamas or
Hizbollah. We must all distance ourselves to an equal degree from the
violent aspects of Israeli policy, just as we distance ourselves from
the military actions of part of the Palestinians and the Lebanese
Hizbollah. Each voice from Israel and Palestine that demands this of us
– and fortunately there are such voices – is a valuable help on this
path and should receive the attention of our media.
Perhaps it would help in the current circumstances to imagine the
reactions of the many intellectuals, writers, artists and musicians of
Jewish origins, from Adorno to Einstein, Freud, Marx and Zweig, of whom
we are so proud and without whom the German culture and the German
contribution to science would be so much smaller. We are convinced that
they would subscribe to the following statement:
Only equality and respect for justice and international law can
guarantee peaceful community and are the only guarantors of a permanent
and secure existence of the State of Israel and the future State of
Palestine – and of the safety of Jews among us and all over the world.
The human rights formulated in the UN Charta and the UN declaration of
human rights emerged against the backdrop of Nazi barbarism, in
particular the industrialised racial mass murder of Jews, Sinti, Roma,
and other minorities. Both documents recognise only the equality of
people without exception. That must also apply for the parties to the
conflict in the Near East.
Altruism or Vested Interest?
What has been said here about the necessity for a balanced and friendly
German Near East policy may sound idealistic in many ears, influenced
too much by ethics and too little by interests. It is appropriate
therefore to reveal the associated vested interest, which in our view
does not detract from the arguments that have been advanced.
The 11 September 2001 made it definitively clear that we are on the road
to a new, highly-explosive East-West conflict which will be much more
difficult to control than the old conflict with its strictly centralised
and reliable commando structures. Although transnational terrorism has
many sources, it is evident that one main source of the increasing
terrorist energy is the unresolved Near East conflict. (The weight of
this insight is not weakened by the fact that many authoritarian or
dictatorial Arab regimes set great store by the maintenance of this
source of conflict because it helps to distract from their own internal
political problems.)
If the opposition between the Islamic and the western world is further
thwarted in the Near East, which was the case in the war in Lebanon to
an extent that exceeded the expectations even of the experts, then not
only the Near East, but more or less the whole world will be effected.
The attacks in Madrid and London and the foiled attacks on trains in
Germany have exposed Europe’s great vulnerability. All further blindly
anti-western solidarity in the Islamic world is a direct threat to the
European Model, which today is so attractive for so many people in the
world, and means more suffering for countless civilians of all possible
religious orientations and nationalities. Everything possible must be
done therefore to remedy this new East-West conflict – at home and
abroad. We owe it to the victims of National Socialism to achieve this
and to support human rights no matter where or by whom they are being
violated.
Authors
Dr. Dieter Arendt, professor of literary studies at the University of
Gießen; Dr. Detlev Bald, historian and researcher in peace studies in
Munich; Dr. Johannes Becker, lecturer in political science at the
University of Marburg; Dr. Jörg Becker, professor of political science
at the University of Marburg; Dr. Tilman Evers, lecturer in political
science at the Free University of in Berlin; Dr. Marianne Gronemeyer,
professor of pedagogy and social science at the University of Applied
Sciences in Wiesbaden; Dr. Dr. Reimer Gronemeyer, professor of sociology
at the University of Gießen; Dr. Karl Holl, professor of history at the
University of Bremen; Prof. Dr. Karlheinz Koppe, former director of the
board of the German society of peace and conflict research (DGFK) in
Bonn; Dr. Gert Krell, professor of political science at the University
of Frankfurt; Dr. Georg Meggle, professor of philosophy at the
University of Leipzig; Dr. Werner Ruf, professor of political science at
the University of Kassel; Dr. Hajo Schmidt, professor of philosophy at
the University of Hagen; Prof. Dr. Udo Steinbach, director of the German
Institute for Oriental Studies in Hamburg; Dr. Reiner Steinweg, literary
studies, peace research and conflict advisor, Linz/Danube; Prof. Dr.
Helmut Thielen, Coordinación General del Instituto Alexander von
Humboldt-ICIBOLA in Porto Alegre/Brazil; Dr. Wolfram Wette, professor of
recent history at the University of Freiburg.
This statement is generally supported by
Dr. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, professor of political science at the
University of Gießen; Dr. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, professor of political
science at the University of Frankfurt; Dr. Egbert Jahn, professor of
political science at the University of Mannheim; Irene Krell, teacher in
Schwalbach; Dr. Gerald Mader, president of the Austrian study centre for
peace and conflict resolution, Stadtschlaining/Burgenland; Hannah Reich,
Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management in Berlin;
Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, head of the Peace Research Institute in Weilheim/Upper
Bavaria; Dr. Christian Wellmann, Deputy Director of the
Schleswig-Holstein Institute of Peace Studies in Kiel.
Url of this article : http://www.tlaxcala.es/pp.asp?reference=1569&lg=en
Cartoon by Jaber Asadi, Iran. Source : irancartoon
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